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Veriﬁcation highlight 
CTBT Evasion Scenarios: Possible or Probable? 
by David Hafemeister, Stanford University 
Evasion in a cavity CTBT’s International Monitoring System 
(IMS). The former U.S. Congressional Ofﬁce 
A possible way to evade seismic detection of of Technology Assessment issued a report in 
a clandestine underground nuclear test is to 1989 on The Containment of Underground 
detonate the device in a large underground Nuclear Explosions, which concluded that: 
cavity, but the individual actions needed to “Since 1970, 126 [U.S.] tests [out of 723] 
hide the evasion are complex and can be have resulted in radioactive materials 
detected and the potential military gains are reaching the atmosphere with a total release 
relatively small. This scenario is known as of about 54,000 Curies. Of this amount, 
cavity decoupling. If the cavity is sufﬁciently 11,500 Curies [roughly one-ﬁfth] were due to 
large, the resulting seismic waves are containment failure and late–time seeps.”2 
mufﬂed and detection becomes more 
challenging. Venting from smaller tests can be 
harder to contain, as the last four U.S. 
Cavity decoupling was the most tests that vented had yields less than 20 kt. 
commonly cited concern during the U.S. Some scientists hypothesize that smaller 
Senate debate on the Comprehensive explosions may not sufﬁciently enclose 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in cavities with a glassiﬁed cage in which 
1999. The 2002 U.S. National Academy the explosion melted the rock to glass to 
of Sciences (NAS) report on Technical prevent venting. Available salt formations 
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Issues Related to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty examined 10 
evasion scenarios from the U.S. intelligence 
community. It concluded that: “…the only 
evasion scenarios that need to be taken 





The seismic signal of a small nuclear 
test in a cavity can be reduced by a factor 
of 70, but such a covert test has additional 
detection risks from the other elaborate 
activities needed to do the test. Thus, a 
successful covert test is possible, but not 
probable, and if it took place it would not be 
militarily signiﬁcant under the U.S. deﬁnition 
of effective veriﬁcation of an arms control 
treaty, as described on page 24. 
Fully decoupled explosions 
An explosion is ‘fully’ decoupled (reduction 
in the measured yield by a factor of 70) if the 
size of the cavity is large enough to reduce 
blast pressure on cavity walls below the elastic 
limit of the media. In salt, the cavity radius 
in metres must be larger than 25 multiplied 
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by the cube root of the yield in kilotons. The 
only “fully” decoupled nuclear test was a very 
small 0.38 kiloton (kt) test in Mississippi, 
USA, in 1966, which was exploded in a 
34–metre diameter salt cavity. In 1976 the 
Soviet Union partially decoupled with a test in 
a salt cavity in Azgir, Kazakhstan. 
Salt is the preferable medium because 
tests in hard rock vent radioactivity more 
easily and because it is easier to create 
a large cavity in salt by solution mining, 
which uses ﬂowing water to dissolve salt to 
make the cavity. Ninety percent of Soviet 
underground tests at Novaya Zemlya in the 
Arctic Ocean vented, as did 40 percent of 
all Soviet tests.1 It is highly likely that a 
signiﬁcant amount (more than 0.1 percent) 
of radionuclides, especially radioxenon, 
would be released and then detected by the 
1 V. Khalturin, T. Rautian, P. Richards and W. Leith, “A Review of Nuclear Testing by the Soviet Union at Novaya Zemlya, 
1955–1990,” Science and Global Security 13, 1–42 (2005). Also NAS–CTBT study, pg. 45 and P. Podvig (ed.), Russian 
Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 440 and 483–566. 
2 For more information see Department of Energy, Radiological Efﬂuent Released from U.S. Continental Tests 1961-1992, 
DOE/NV (Rev. 1) UC-702, August 1996. 
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of the proper depth and thickness are 
limited, and are usually in regions that 
transmit seismic waves readily and are less 
seismically active, making detection easier. 
Suitable salt deposits can be found in China, 
Kazakhstan, Iran, northern Pakistan, Russia 
and the United States. 
The NAS panel determined that 
an explosion in a cavity: “…cannot be 
conﬁdently hidden if its yield is larger than 
1 or 2 kilotons.” Other observers quote 
higher thresholds, which are possible, but not 
probable. The higher the estimate, the more 
likely the clandestine test will be detected. The 
higher estimates ignore the additional capacity 
of the IMS’s auxiliary seismic network, the 
ability to discriminate with higher frequency 
components, and they ignore the critical steps 
listed on page 23. Arrays of seismographs 
and other seismic capabilities can detect and 
identify events with yields considerably less 
  
     
    
       
     
      
      
      





        
  
than one kt at distances of more than 2,000 
km. And advances in regional seismology 
(seismic waves from distances less than 
1500 km that travel within 100 km of the 
surface) have been dramatic in the past 
decade. Moreover, a successful clandestine 
test must avoid a signiﬁcant “yield 
excursion”, which is particularly difﬁcult 
for new nuclear weapon States. The NAS 
panel noted that an inexperienced State 
that wanted to prevent detection: “…would 
probably try to limit test yields to 0.1 kiloton 
or less,” which is not militarily signiﬁcant. 
Cheating is a 
many step process 
In the 1999 U.S. Senate debate, Treaty 
opponents pointed to a classiﬁed CTBT
National Intelligence Estimate and other 
intelligence community documents that 
made cavity cheating appear too easy 
by not properly taking into account the 
six factors listed below. Even if each of 
these tasks could be carried out with high 
conﬁdence (i.e. a 90 percent chance of 
success), there would be a cumulative 50 
percent chance of avoiding detection of 
one test and only a 15 percent chance that 
three tests could be carried out without 
detection. Note that the small three kt, May 
2009 North Korean test was observed at 61 
IMS stations. It should be noted that U.S. 
national technical means, when directed at 
regions of concern, are more capable than 
the IMS system. It is unlikely that a State 
could simultaneously overcome all of the 
following technical hurdles at the same 
time at a signiﬁcant yield: 
1) Violators must avoid signiﬁcant yield 
excursions. All successful ﬁrst tests, 
if carried out in a cavity, would be 
detected by the IMS: United States 
F I G U R E 2 : T H E V E N T I N G  O F  B A N E B E R RY AT T H E  N E VA D A T E S T  S I T E ,  W H I C H WA S U N C H A R A C T E R I S T I C A L LY
L A R G E . [ U . S . AT O M I C  E N E R G Y C O M M I S S I O N ,  1 9 7 0 ] .  
(21 kt), Soviet Union (20 kt), United 
Kingdom (25 kt), France (65 kt), India 
(12 kt), Pakistan (9 kt), North Korea 
(0.6 kt observed by 22 IMS stations in 
October 2006).3 
2) It is necessary to conceal the materials 
removed to create a test shaft and cavity 
from satellites. 
3) Crater and surface changes due to 
testing must be hidden from space-based 
interferometric synthetic aperture3 A 90 percent success rate on seismic cheating is a 10 percent detection rate, much lower than the usual 90 percent detection 

rate. This lowers the detection threshold by 0.5 mb units (O. Dahlman, et al, Nuclear Test Ban, Springer 2009, pg. 167). (InSAR), a remote sensing technique 





       
       
    
      
     
     
    
     
 
  
       
        
     
       
    
    
     
 
      
      
      
 
       
       
       
    
      
      
       
       











    
     
     
     
    
    
  
that uses radar satellite images and other 
technologies. The North Korean, Indian 
and Pakistani test sites were located with 
commercial satellite images. 
4) Practically all the radioactive gases and 
particles must be trapped. The sensitivity 
of radioxenon detectors has greatly 
surpassed speciﬁcations. Detectors on 
airplanes can ﬂy into radionuclide plumes. 
5) Cheaters must avoid detection of weak 
seismic signals by closer stations and 
arrays. The P/S (pressure to transverse 
wave) ratio above 6 Hz has very 
successfully discriminated earthquakes 
from explosions.4 
T H E  1 9 6 4  S A L M O N  E V E N T,  A F I V E K T D E T O N AT I O N
C O N D U C T E D  2 8 0  M E T R E S D E E P I N A M I S S I S S I P P I S A LT
D O M E ,  C O N F I R M E D T H E T H E O RY O F D E C O U P L I N G  A S  
A M E A N S O F C O N C E A L I N G  C L A N D E S T I N E N U C L E A R  
E X P L O S I O N S .  I N T H I S P H O T O ,  E X P E R I M E N T E R S A R E  
L O W E R I N G  A C A N I S T E R C O N TA I N I N G  T H E N U C L E A R  
E X P L O S I V E F O R T H E  S A L M O N  E V E N T. 
4 K. Walter, “Sleuthing Seismic Signals,” Science and 
Technology Review, March 2009, pp. 5–12 
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6) Cheaters must prevent detection by 
national technical means, which are more 
powerful than the IMS when directed 
at suspicious areas. Human intelligence 
provided the locations of Iran’s centrifuges 
and other clandestine sites. 
What kind of cheating 
would matter? 
The principal risk that needs to be avoided 
is that a country could alter the strategic 
balance or signiﬁcantly disadvantage national 
security. The 2002 NAS report concluded that: 
“Countries with lesser prior test experience 
and/or design sophistication would also lack 
the sophisticated test-related expertise to 
extract much value from such very-low-yield 
tests as they might be able to conceal.” The 
NAS panel judged that: “States with extensive 
prior test experience are the ones most likely 
to be able to get away with any substantial 
degree of clandestine testing.” Low yield 
tests by nuclear weapon States should not, by 
themselves, materially change the strategic 
balance. Moreover, several clandestine tests 
are needed to change design parameters, 
improving the chance of detection. 
Military signiﬁcance
of violations 
The CTBT provides a strong deterrent against 
nuclear testing since it strengthens the global 
norm against testing. This is evidenced by 
the 2008 United Nations General Assembly 
resolution on the CTBT (175 in favour with 
only the U.S. voting against), the few tests 
that have been conducted since 1996, and the 
CTBT’s 181 Member States. Furthermore, 
there have been consensus declarations at all 
of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry 
into Force of the CTBT, including by those 
States that have not yet ratiﬁed. The possibility 
of avoiding seismic detection with a cavity 
should not be confused with the probability of 
detection during the six steps outlined above. 
Finally, we need to consider the 
military signiﬁcance of violations. The 
U.S. standard for effective veriﬁcation of an 
arms control treaty was deﬁned in 1988 by 
Ambassador Paul Nitze during the Foreign 
Relations Committee’s consideration of the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as 
follows:
“....if the other side moves beyond the limits 
of the treaty in any militarily signiﬁcant way, 
we would be able to detect such violation in 
time to respond effectively and thereby deny 
the other side the beneﬁt of the violation.” 
Thus, cheating that could threaten 
national security in a militarily signiﬁcant 
way must be detected in sufﬁcient time. In 
the case of a nation that already has nuclear 
weapons, effective veriﬁcation is determined 
by the military signiﬁcance of the additional 
nuclear weapons capabilities it might obtain 
by cheating, beyond those it had before the 
treaty was in place. 
A worst–case analysis was carried out 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
for START I and START II ratiﬁcations. The 
Executive Reports issued by the Committee 
on the START Treaties in 1992 and 1995 
concluded that potential treaty violations 
were not militarily signiﬁcant, namely the 
Soviets (and then the Russians) would gain 
little with massive cheating in their ability to 
hurt U.S. strategic forces beyond what they 
could achieve without resorting to this. 
These results allowed the Senate to 
determine that the two START Treaties 
were effectively veriﬁable. By the same 
standard, the CTBT is effectively veriﬁable. 
Evasive cheating in cavities is possible, but 
not probable and data extraction is more 
complicated. Without a CTBT the probability 
of a nuclear test would be considerably 
higher because of reduced monitoring 
without the IMS and a diminished global 
norm against testing without a CTBT. 
C T B T O S P E C T R U M  1 3  |  S E P T E M B E R  2 0 0 9  
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Biographical note 
Net beneﬁt analysis 
General John Shalikashvili, former 
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, concluded in Findings and 
Recommendations Concerning the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
in 2001: 
“I believe that it is very much in our 
national interest to secure these beneﬁts 
through entry into force of the Test Ban 
Treaty. If this opportunity is lost, the 
United States’ ability to lead an effective 
global campaign against nuclear 
proliferation will be severely damaged.” 
Shalikashvili commented on 
evasions with these conclusions: 
■ There will always be some gap between zero-
yield and the lower limit of remote sensing 
capability to detect, identify, and locate an 
explosion. With on-site inspections and other 
sources of information, though, it is more 
likely that very low-yield testing would be 
detected or deterred with the Test Ban Treaty 
than without it. 
■ Experienced nuclear weapon States such as 
Russia, and to a lesser extent China, could 
engage in some evasive testing. However, tests 
that are small and infrequent enough to avoid 
detection would not permit them to develop 
new weapon systems that would undermine 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and eventually even 
such violations are likely to be caught. 
■ The veriﬁcation regime established 
under the Treaty will enhance the United 
States’ own very capable nuclear test 
monitoring system and foster new 
techniques to improve veriﬁcation. ■ 
Professor David 
Hafemeister of the 
USA was the lead 
staff on technical 
matters for the 
ratiﬁcation of 
START, the Treaty 
on Conventional 
Forces in Europe 
(CFE) and the 
Threshold Test-Ban 
Treaty (TTBT) while serving at the Senate 
Committees on Foreign Relations and 
Governmental Affairs from 1990 to 1993. 
He has also worked on non-proliferation 
issues for the State Department, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and the 
National Academy of Sciences. In 1996 
Hafemeister received the Leó Szilárd Award. 
Over recent years, he has authored several 
books and papers on CTBT veriﬁability.■
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NE W PU BL ICAT ION C O M I NG I N OC T O BE R 2009
Science for Security: Verifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
The publication is dedicated to the International Scientiﬁc Studies Conference (ISS09), which took 
place in Vienna, Austria, from 10 to 12 June 2009. ISS09 was attended by around 500 scientists 
and 100 diplomats from 100 countries who came together to present and discuss results from the 
ISS project, which has engaged the scientiﬁc community since early 2008. 
The purpose of the ISS is twofold: to conduct independent assessments of the capabilities and 
readiness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s (CTBT) veriﬁcation regime; and to 
identify scientiﬁc and technological developments that might enhance these capabilities as well as 
improve the cost-effectiveness of the products and services of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). 
During ISS09, scientists presented more than 200 posters covering all of the areas relevant to 
CTBT veriﬁcation. This was the ﬁrst time ever that such a comprehensive collection of scientiﬁc 
work related to the CTBT has been submitted. 
Many of the scientists closely involved in the ISS project have contributed articles to the 
publication, offering their summaries and analyses of the issues presented and discussed at ISS09, 
including world-renowned seismologists Paul Richards and Lynn Sykes. 
For more information 
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